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Comment on “A short impossibility proof of quantum bit commitment”
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
In a recent letter (Phys. Lett. A 377 (2013) 1076), the authors presented an impossibility proof
of quantum bit commitment, which attempted to cover all possible protocols that involve both
quantum and classical information. Here we show that there are many errors in the proof, thus it
fails to exhaust all conceivable protocols.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Ac
While it is widely believed that unconditionally secure
quantum bit commitment (QBC) is impossible, the com-
pleteness of previous impossibility proofs have been con-
tinually challenged. As pointed out in a recent letter [1],
“the debate can be only settled with an appropriate for-
mulation of the problem, which is sufficiently powerful
to include all possible protocols in a single simple math-
ematical object”. Ref. [1] made a good attempt towards
this direction. Unfortunately, we found that the goal is
still not accomplished, as their proof contains the follow-
ing problems.
I. WRONG MODELLING OF THE HISTORY OF
CLASSICAL INFORMATION
At the beginning of Section 4.1 of Ref. [1], the au-
thors wrote that “sl = i0i1...il will represent the history
of classical information with i2k−1 denoting the outcome
of Bob’s quantum operation at step k (which is the same
as Alice’s classical input at Alice’s step k) and i2k−2 for
k > 1 represents Bob’s input classical information (which
is Alice’s output at step k−1)”. That is, they think that
Bob’s (Alice’s) output always equals to Alice’s (Bob’s) in-
put. This point may look fine at the first glance, because
in the 1st paragraph of Section 3.7 the authors defined
sl (and therefore all i’s included in sl) as the classical in-
formation being openly exchanged. However, we should
note that there can be protocols in which some outcomes
are allowed to be kept secret without being exchanged.
Meanwhile, these secret information can also affect the
participants’ choices of quantum operations. For exam-
ple, at a certain step k0 Bob’s outcome can include both
i2k0−1 and i
∗
2k0−1
, where i2k0−1 is publicly exchanged and
becomes Alice’s input while i∗2k0−1 is kept secret to him-
self. At a later step k1, Bob can choose which quantum
operation to apply, depending not only on the classical
information already exchanged, but also on i∗2k0−1 (e.g.,
on a certain comparison result between i∗2k0−1 and Alice’s
recent output). Thus i∗2k0−1 becomes a part of Bob’s
own input at this step. In such protocols, one partici-
pant’s output is not always the same as the other’s input
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at each step, as opposed to the case the authors studied.
As a consequence, in the general case the history of
classical information s should include not only all i’s be-
ing exchanged, but also all i∗’s being kept secret. Such
an s is not always known completely to either Alice or
Bob. Each of them can only know a different part of
s. A cheating strategy must conform to all i’s, i.e.,
the communication interface, as mentioned at the end
of the 1st paragraph of their Section 4. But this is not
enough. A successful cheating should also agree with i∗’s
of the other participant. Therefore, it becomes doubt-
ful whether a dishonest Alice has sufficient information
to calculate the unitary transformation P in Eq. (69),
as the related equations in their Section 5.1 all depend
on the history of classical information s. (Note that the
authors dropped the index s for simplicity, as they men-
tioned in the paragraph below Eq. (68).) Without P,
Alice’s cheating procedure described below Eq. (72) can-
not be performed.
Some might argue that in a protocol all participants
can measure only the information that are required to
be publicly announced. All other secret can be kept on
the quantum level without collapsing into classical in-
formation, so that i∗’s can be treated as a part of the
quantum system being exchanged and does not need to
be included in s. However, while classical information
is a special case of quantum ones, it is so special that
it can be cloned perfectly, cannot be altered, and there
is only one measurement basis for reading the informa-
tion, no other nonorthogonal bases exist. On the con-
trary, quantum information does not have these partic-
ularities. Thus classical information cannot always be
replaced with quantum ones, especially when there can
be dishonest participants who want to alter the content
or perform measurements in other bases. Delaying the
measurement on one’s own quantum system may not al-
ways be a benefit for an honest participant (at least, even
though it is indeed a benefit in some particular protocols
previously proposed, there still lacks of such a general
proof in literature, including Ref. [1]). Especially, as
described in the 1st paragraph of Section 3.7, the quan-
tum system is exchanged back and forth between the
participants. Therefore in a well-designed protocol, an
honest participant’s measuring his own quantum system
can help him gain more information from the system,
and keeping these information secret will put more lim-
2its on the other participant’s freedom on altering the sys-
tem dishonestly in later steps. (Note that it is not the
purpose of our current comment to discuss whether the
conclusion “unconditionally secure QBC is impossible”
is correct. Instead, it is to discuss whether the current
proof is sufficient to lead to this conclusion. For this rea-
son, here we will not go into detail on how to construct
such a protocol, and would rather leave it elsewhere.)
On the other hand, if an honest participant announces
openly all the classical information that he obtained from
his measurements, then he is surely easier to be cheated
since he lets his opponent know too much. Therefore,
if s is taken merely as the classical information being
exchanged, while the secret information i∗’s are not in-
cluded, then not all the measurements in the protocols
are fully considered, so that the corresponding impossi-
bility proof cannot be regarded as general.
Also, it might be the intention of the authors that these
secret information could be treated as the content of the
quantum memories, so that they do not need to be in-
cluded in the classical information s. But we must note
that the quantum memory was merely mentioned briefly
in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of Ref. [1]. After that, the authors
seemed to forget its role. The contribution of its content
on the form of the cheating operations was never formu-
lated in a rigorous mathematical manner. Especially, the
change of the memory content was not considered.
II. LOOPHOLE ON THE CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN STRATEGIES AND CONDITIONED
COMBS
After the proof of Theorem 2 in Section 3.7, it was
claimed that as a consequence of the theorem, “single-
party strategies in a protocol are in one-to-one correspon-
dence with conditioned combs”. However, let us look
into the details of the proof of Theorem 2. It said that
“if we apply the von Neumann-Lu¨ders measurements
{IS2k⊗|s2k〉 〈s2k|} on the input space H2k before channel
Ck, followed by {IS2k+1 ⊗ |s2k+1〉 〈s2k+1|} on the output
space H2k+1 after channel Ck, we obtain the conditioned
quantum operations {C s2k
i2k+1
}”. That is, the correspon-
dence between a strategy and a conditioned comb is valid
only if the mentioned measurements are performed. But
what if the measurements are applied in other bases, or
not performed at all? Then there will be no guarantee
that the correct conditioned quantum operations will be
obtained.
Note that “whether QBC can be secure” and “whether
the current proof is sufficiently general” are two different
stories. That is, on one hand, it is true that a protocol
is insecure if it can be proven that a successful cheating
strategy still exists even when the cheater honestly per-
forms the measurement required in this particular step.
While on the other hand, the model of QBC cannot be
considered general if there is no proof showing that the
cheater always has to perform this measurement hon-
estly. In the presented proof, as shown in their Fig. 2,
the measurement of the quantum tester is performed at
the opening stage only, instead of being performed after
each step k (k = 0, ..., N−1). Therefore, while the proto-
col requires the strings s2k, s2k+1 to be announced clas-
sically, there is nothing to ensure that both participants
indeed obtain all these strings by the honest measure-
ments {IS2k ⊗ |s2k〉 〈s2k|} and {IS2k+1 ⊗ |s2k+1〉 〈s2k+1|}.
It is possible that they merely announce s2k, s2k+1 by
guess without measurements, or by using other dishon-
est measurements.
For this reason, the proof that the authors presented to
Theorem 2 is valid only when all internal participants al-
ways perform the measurements honestly. Thus it works
fine if we apply Eq. (54) of Ref. [1] merely to formulate
quantum cryptographic protocols in which all internal le-
gitimate participants are willing to collaborate honestly
against external cheating. The well-known quantum key
distribution is a typical example of such protocols. On
the other hand, in cryptographic tasks where some of
the internal legitimate participants may attempt to cheat
(e.g., QBC), the measurements required in the proof of
Theorem 2 may not be performed honestly. In this case,
the correspondence between strategies and conditioned
combs does not necessarily holds, so that Eq. (54) is
not sufficiently general to represent all possible protocols
where there are dishonest internal participants.
III. WHO SHOULD PERFORM THE LAST
MOVE
Also in the 1st paragraph of Section 4.1, the authors
claimed that “at the end of the commitment stage we can
assume without loss of generality that Alice performs the
last move” because “for a protocol where the last move is
Bob’s, we can always add a null move”. This is a tricky
part of their impossibility proof, which makes it easier
to come up with a cheating strategy for Alice. All these
who had attempted to construct unconditionally secure
QBC would know that one of the biggest difficulty is to
force measurements, especially, to force a dishonest Al-
ice to finish her measurements during the commitment
stage. It is surely favorable to Alice if she is assumed to
perform the last move and she does not use a null one,
as Bob can no longer check whether Alice has performed
this step honestly (or whether it is indeed a null move)
before the end of the commitment stage. For example, if
an honest Alice is supposed to finish some measurements
in the last move, a dishonest Alice will then be able to
delay the measurements until the beginning of the open-
ing stage, because there is no Bob’s move in between to
check Alice’s behavior. Thus we can see that assuming
Alice to perform the last move is not appropriate.
3IV. MISUSE OF THE CONCEALMENT
CONDITION
In the last paragraph of the left column of page 9,
the authors wrote that “a protocol that is not concealing
at step k is also not concealing at any following step”.
This statement could be wrong, depending on how “not
concealing” is defined here. It may be true if “not con-
cealing” means that ρ(0) and ρ(1) (the density matrices
of the states at Bob’s side at this step corresponding to
the committed values b = 0 and b = 1, respectively) are
rigorously orthogonal to each other. But it is not true
if it means that ρ(0) and ρ(1) do not satisfy the conceal-
ment condition Eq. (60) rigorously. In fact, Eq. (60)
does not have to be satisfied at any step of the protocol.
It is necessary only for the last step before the opening.
This is because in the middle of the commitment stage
of a well-designed protocol, Bob will still be subjected
to other security checks at later steps, where he may be
required to measure his quantum system in other bases
which are different than the one that could distinguish
ρ(0) and ρ(1). If the protocol that is partially not con-
cealing at step k, i.e., Eq. (60) is not satisfied while ρ(0)
and ρ(1) are not rigorously orthogonal either, then Bob’s
measurement for distinguishing ρ(0) and ρ(1) could cause
a detectable disturbance to the quantum system, so that
he will be caught in the security checks at later steps.
With this method, while the protocol is not concealing
at a middle step k, Bob is held back from applying the
necessary measurement to distinguish ρ(0) and ρ(1). Thus
it is insufficient for the impossibility proof when the au-
thors only “focus on the last step N before the opening”.
Consequently, their results thereafter become unreliable.
Similarly, the 1st sentence of the last paragraph of their
Section 5.2 said that “for a protocol with unbounded
number of rounds, the conditions of ε-concealment and
δ-closeness are still given by Eqs. (60) and (65), respec-
tively”. We can see that the authors also missed to notice
the possibility that a secure protocol does not have to be
concealing at the middle stage, as long as there is proper
security checks in later steps that can prevent Bob from
distinguishing ρ(0) and ρ(1) at this stage. Therefore, their
proof is insufficient to cover all protocols with unbounded
number of rounds either.
V. OTHER ERRORS
There are also other problems in Ref. [1] which seem
relatively less critical but still should not be ignored, as
enlisted below.
A. Probability of failure
At the end of Section 2.1, the authors said that Bob’s
measurement will result “in a failure, e.g. due to the de-
tection of an attempted cheat. Again, in a well-designed
protocol the probability of failure should be vanishingly
small”. This is bewildering. When Alice cheats, the
probability of failure in a well-designed protocol should
not be small, otherwise the protocol is surely insecure.
B. Tester for an honest Bob
In the 1st paragraph of Section 3.4, it stated that “a
dishonest Bob will perform a tester to distinguish Alice’s
strategies before the opening”. This statement could
sound misleading, as it seems to suggest that an hon-
est Bob will not perform the tester. But if this is true,
then the QBC being studied are merely those protocols in
which the measurements of an honest Bob are excluded.
That is, a large class of QBC protocols with measure-
ments will be left out from their proof.
C. Concealment versus abortion
In the 2nd paragraph of its Summary, the authors
claimed that “concealment is defined regardless abor-
tion, namely Bob cannot detect the bit value anyway,
whether Alice catches him or not”. This condition is
too strong. If Bob can learn the bit but Alice can catch
him whenever he manages to do so, then the protocol is
generally still regarded as secure.
In summary, there are many logical problems in Ref.
[1]. Thus it becomes doubtful whether the existing
impossibility proof of unconditionally secure QBC is
sufficiently general to cover all possible protocols. Still,
comparing with a lot of previous impossibility proofs, the
current one is more valuable as it attempts to construct
the proof with an unambiguous detailed presentation,
so that the (im)possibility of QBC can be discussed in a
precise way.
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